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RESPONSE TO NATURE OF THE CASE 
It is obvious that Appellant and Appellee view the nature of 
this case differently. Rather than discuss this in great detail, 
Appellant refers the court to her opening brief. Appellee claims 
that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at the trial level was vague 
and only cited as its basis "constitutional grounds", however, 
Appellee misleads the court. 
The Motion to Dismiss did state "upon constitutional 
grounds", but it did not stop there. The Motion to Dismiss also 
cited "and for the reasons set forth in Defendant's memorandum 
filed herewith". (Index of Clerk's Papers 61 and Appendix to 
Appellant's Opening Brief, Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss A-2) The trial memorandum cited as the constitutional 
grounds the double jeopardy clauses of the Utah and the United 
States Constitutions as well as due process problems. 
RESPONSE TO ISSUES, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS & STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant will not address the incorrect slant placed on the 
facts by Appellee, but refers the court to her opening brief and 
the record. 
RESPONSE TO ARGUMENT OF FAILURE TO PRESERVE DUE PROCESS CLAIMS 
As pointed out above, Appellee misleads the court on the 
issue of whether or not due process was preserved as an issue for 
this appeal and claims that this issue was never before the trial 
court. The record is clear that such a statement is contrary to 
the facts and the record. In Appellant's Memorandum In Support of 
Motion to Dismiss, Appellant discussed Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 
1 
480 U.S. 39, 107 S. Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed. 40, (1987), where the State 
failed to turn over to the defense taped interviews with an 
alleged victim. (Index of Clerk's Papers 61 and Appendix to 
Opening Brief at A-2) Defendant stated in her memorandum to the 
trial court: 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that this violated the 
confrontation and due process clauses of the federal 
constitution. The Supreme Court on review at the request of 
the prosecution held that a Defendant is entitled to all 
information held by the State related to an offense, but 
that in the case of child protective records, the inspection 
of those records should be done by the court before the 
records are turned over to the Defendant ij£ the State claims 
the records are confidential and not subject to disclosure. 
(Emphases added.) 
Appellant also discussed due process in the memorandum when 
she discussed prosecutorial vindictiveness: 
The United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant is 
entitled to be protected from "the vindictive exercise of a 
prosecutor's discretion." Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 
94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974). In Perry, a North 
Carolina prison inmate sought a writ of habeas corpus when a 
prosecutor charged him with a felony after he sought to 
exercise his rights to a trial de novo. The Supreme Court 
held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
was contravened by such conduct. The court held that a 
defendant is entitled to pursue her rights without 
apprehension that the state will retaliate with additional 
charges. Proof of actual vindictiveness is not required: 
There is, of course, no evidence that the prosecutor in this 
case acted in bad faith or maliciously in seeking a felony 
indictment against Perry. (Emphasis added.) 
In Bordenkircher v. Haves, 98 S.Ct. 663, 434 U.S. 357, 
(1978), the Supreme Court stated that the bringing of 
additional changes against a Defendant who refuses to do as 
the prosecution suggests is "prosecutorial vindictiveness": 
This Court held in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 
725, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2080, 23 L.Ed.2d 656, that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "requires that 
vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully 
attacked his first conviction must play no part in the 
sentence he receives after a new trial." The same 
principle was later applied to prohibit a prosecutor from 
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reindicting a convicted misdemeanant on a felony charge 
after the defendant had invoked an appellate remedy, since 
in this situation there was also a "realistic likelihood of 
'vindictiveness.' " Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S., at 27, 
94 S.Ct., at 2102. (Emphasis added.) 
Then later, in Perry, the Court applied the same principle 
to prosecutorial conduct where there was a "realistic 
likelihood of 'vindictiveness.' " 417 U.S., at 27, 94 
S.Ct., at 2102. It held that the requirement of Fourteenth 
Amendment due process prevented a prosecutor's reindictment 
of a convicted misdemeanant on a felony charge after the 
defendant had exercised his right to appeal the misdemeanor 
conviction and thus to obtain a trial de novo. (Emphasis 
added.) 
In the summary of Appellant's trial memorandum she pointed 
out to the trial court: 
The State of Utah cannot retry Defendant. Should this court 
disagree, then the court should find that because of the 
conduct of the prosecutor the state has violated Defendant's 
due process rights so that the case should be dismissed. 
Appellee also does not understand the law and relies on 
those cases that deal with the failure to object to jury 
instructions as the basis for a claim that Appellant has not 
preserved her appeal issues at the trial court level. In State v. 
Sheldon, 545 P.2d 513, (Utah 1976), Justice Maughan, in his 
dissenting opinion, pointed out: 
As can be seen, the rule requiring defenses based on 
constitutional grounds be first asserted in the lower court 
is not always strictly applied. Particularly is this so 
where the constitutional question arises 'in cases involving 
the deprivation of life or liberty.' 5 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal 
and Error, Section 574. 
This court has heretofore addressed itself to a situation, 
similar to the one here on appeal, where the constitutional 
issue was first raised on appeal. In the matter of In Re 
Woodward, 14 Utah 2d 336, 384 P.2d 110 (1963). Mr. Chief 
Justice Henriod in giving the opinion of the court said: 
"There may be some doubt as to whether we should review the 
two points on appeal having to do with the sections 
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mentioned, supra, since they were raised on appeal for the 
first time. If what we say in this opinion would jeopardize 
the liberty of appellant . . . there would be authority for 
raising a constitutional issue for the first time on 
appeal." 
The main and concurring opinions confuse trial tactics not 
objected to, at the trial level, with the constitutionality 
of the whole proceeding. 
The attempt to try a matter anew, for the first time on 
appeal, by advancing a different theory, or by attacking an 
instruction not objected to at the trial, is by no stretch 
of the imagination concomitant with a constitutional issue. 
The former may not effect the legality of the proceeding; 
the latter certainly does. The constitution is not subject 
to the proceedings, the trial tactics, if you will. The 
proceedings are subject to the constitution. 
Justice Maughan's points were explained by the United States 
Supreme Court in Fay v. Noia, 83 S.Ct. 822, 372 U.S. 391, 
(U.S.N.Y. 1963) which was a proceeding upon the application by a 
state prisoner for writ of habeas corpus on the ground that he 
had been deprived of his constitutional rights: 
Assume that a man is indicted, and held for trial in a state 
court, by a grand jury from which members of his race have 
been systematically excluded. Assume further that the State 
requires any objection to the composition of the grand jury 
to be raised prior to the verdict, that no such objection is 
made, and that the defendant seeks to raise the point for 
the first time on appeal from his conviction....Our survey 
discloses nothing to suggest that the Federal District Court 
lacked the power to order Noia discharged because of a 
procedural forfeiture he may have incurred under state 
law State procedural rules plainly must yield to this 
overriding federal policy. 
A fortiori, due process denied in the proceedings 
leading to conviction is not restored just because the state 
court declines to adjudicate the claimed denial on the 
merits 
Not only is Appellee's claim that the due process issue was 
not preserved for appeal factually incorrect, it is legally 
unsound as constitutional claims are often raised for the first 
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time on appeal. 
RESPONSE TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY ARGUMENT 
Appellee claims that Appellant asked for a mistrial and 
cannot now challenge its granting. Law must be read with reason. 
Appellant was forced to either continue a trial before a jury 
taunted by the prosecution or request a mistrial. Reason and case 
law, as pointed out in Appellant's opening brief, states that 
under such circumstances, Appellant has not voluntarily sought a 
mistrial. Appellant has "substantial constitutional right 
guaranteed her under both the Utah and the United States 
Constitutions" which were violated by the prosecution. She cannot 
be deemed to have voluntarily requested a mistrial. State v. 
Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354 (1979) 
Appellee relies on the claim that the trial court found no 
"bad faith" on the part of the prosecutor, but "bad faith" is not 
required nor are the findings of the trial court binding in this 
issue even if they were: 
a North Carolina prison inmate sought a writ of habeas 
corpus when a prosecutor charged him with a felony after he 
sought to exercise his rights to a trial de novo. The 
Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was contravened by such conduct. The 
court held that a defendant is entitled to pursue her rights 
without apprehension that the state will retaliate with 
additional charges. Proof of actual vindictiveness is not 
required. Blackledqe v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 
40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974). (Emphasis added.) 
The record supports Appellant's position that, but for the 
conduct of the Appellee, she would not have been forced to seek a 
mistrial to insure she received a fair trial. Appellant believes 
that she has adequately cover the double jeopardy issue in her 
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opening brief. 
DISCOVERY VIOLATION 
Appellee claims that there was "no discovery violation" 
because the state "provided all that it had". A similar factual 
issue was addressed in State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, (Utah 
1985) : 
When a request or an order for discovery is made pursuant to 
§ 77-35-16(a), a prosecutor must comply. To meet basic 
standards of fairness and to ensure that a trial is a real 
quest for truth and not simply a contest between the parties 
to win, a defendant's request for information which has been 
voluntarily complied with, or a court order of discovery 
must be deemed to be a continuing request. And even though 
there is no court-ordered disclosure, a prosecutor's failure 
to disclose newly discovered inculpatory information which 
falls with the ambit of § 77-35-16(a), after the prosecution 
has made a voluntary disclosure of evidence might so mislead 
defendant as to cause prejudicial error. 
After and obvious attempt to avoid admitting that there was 
discovery which Appellee fail to disclose, the prosecutor admits 
that there was. (Appellee Brief at 19) and Transcript of February 
23, 1999, pages 13-15) 
The Court: You know, it would just help if you would just 
say there wasn't a tape of it. Is there a tape? 
Mr. Halls: There is a tape. There's a video tape of an 
interview with the victim.... 
Appellee tries to avoid the implications of due process by 
focusing on the claim that there was no transcript of the tape 
and accuses counsel of ungentlemanly conduct for pursuing the 
issue of the failure to produce potentially exculpatory evidence. 
Appellee concedes this at page 21 of its brief: 
The Defendant asserts that such tapes may contain 
exculpatory information which could have been used as a tool 
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to cross examine the victim While these assertions may 
be true; nothing prevented counsel from going to the 
prosecutor's office and viewing the tapes..., (Emph a sis 
added.) 
At issue in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, supra, was the State's 
failure to turn over taped interviews with alleged victims. The 
United States Supreme Court held that the defendant v/as entitled 
to copies of the tapes. Appellee here claims that the United 
States Supreme Court is wrong since it did not both to have a 
transcript of the tapes prepared. 
Appellee also cites Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure that allows inspection at the prosecutor's office "when 
convenience reasonably requires". The question must be posed: 
Does convenience require counsel for Appellant to travel from 
Phoenix, Arizona, to Monticello, Utah, a drive of eight (8) 
hours, to view the video tape or does convenience and due process 
require that a copy of the tape be made at a cost of less than 
$10 and the copy be sent to counsel for Appellant? 
It appears that Appellee interprets Rule 16 to mean what is 
"convenient" to Appellee rather than what Rule 16 contemplates 
which is that parties to litigation work together in criminal 
prosecutions to aid in the "search for truth upon which a just 
judgment may be predicated" so that the "procedural rules" which 
"are designed to promote that objective, not frustrate it" can be 
properly implemented and so that "a criminal proceeding" becomes 
"more than an adversarial contest between two competing sides". 
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, (Utah 1985) 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The State of Utah should not be permitted to retry 
Defendant* This court should find that because of the conduct of 
the prosecutor the state has violated Defendant's due process 
rights so that the case should be dismissed. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
^m^t— 
C. ROBERT COLLINS 
Attorney for Appellant/Defendant 
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